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Abstract—The Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy
Networks (RPL) is the existing routing protocol for Internet of
Things (IoT). RPL is a proactive,lightweight, Distance Vector
protocol which offers security against various forms of routing
attacks. Still, there are various attacks(as rank, version attacks
and many more ) which is possible in this network due to problem
of unauthenticated or unencrypted control frames, centralized
root controller, compromised or unauthenticated devices and
many more ways. There are various solutions present in the
literature but every solution has its pros and cons. There is
no appropriate system framework till now which completely
solves these all issues. So, we present an ultimate approach to
mitigate these RPL attacks more efficiently and effectively. We
use IDS based system for internal attacks and a mini-firewall
for removing the external attacks. In IDS based approach, we
use intrusion detection system at multiple locations for analyzing
the behaviour of nodes. The final decision whether the node is
attacker or not depends on mainly three things as: trust between
the neighbouring nodes, local decision by multiple sink nodes
and global decision by root node. We also use some blockchain
features in this framework for better internal security. We use
some threshold values and rules in mini-firewall for removing
external attacks. In this paper, we provide the proposed approach
and theoretical analysis of this approach which provide better
protection from these attacks than any other method.
Index Terms—Internet of Things(IoT), Routing Protocol, RPL
Attacks, Low Power Lossy Networks, Multiple Sink Nodes, Trust,
Local Decision, Global Decision, Blockchain, Intrusion Detection
System(IDS) , Mini-Firewall.
I. INTRODUCTION
In todays world, IoT is technical revolutionary area in
mobile and wireless communication field which deploy Low
power and Lossy Networks (LLN). These networks are typ-
ically composed of many heterogeneous embedded devices
with limited power, memory, and processing resources. Now,
IoT is applicable in many areas such as industrial monitoring,
smart home, health care, environmental monitoring, smart
city, smart grid and many more. Due to the huge number of
applications of these networks, security become a critical part
for privacy of personal data. RPL is default routing protocol in
these network which is susceptible from various attacks. Now,
We briefly describe the related technologies use in this paper.
A. Routing Protocol as RPL and it’s Attacks
RPL is distance based proactive protocol used for routing
in IoT network. At beginning, a RPL protocol creates a graph-
like structure called the Destination Oriented Directed Acyclic
Graph (DODAG). The DODAG consists of paths from the
sender nodes(IoT devices) to the sink node(6LBR). During
routing, every node maintains its rank relative to its position
in the DODAG tree, and every DODAG is maintained by
control and route information . The control frames are used by
DODAG are DODAG Information Object (DIO),Destination
Advertisement Object (DAO) and DODAG Information Solic-
itation (DIS) for transmitting the DODAG information. Route
path selection is a key factor for RPL, RPL use the Various
routing metrics, route constraints and objective functions (OF)
such as hop count, energy minimization and latency to com-
pute the best route path. The basic framework of RPL network
is shown below.
Fig. 1. RPL Based Low Power Lossy Network
There are various attacks possible in RPL network which
significantly impact the network resources and its perfor-
mance. These attacks are possible due to the problem of
unauthenticated or unencrypted control frames, centralized
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root controller, compromised and unauthenticated devices and
many more ways. Some of these attacks are shown in figure
2 and briefly describe below.
Fig. 2. RPL Network Attacks
1) Sinkhole Attack: In this internal attack, attacker or
compromised node advertises beneficial path to attract many
nearby nodes to route traffic through it. This attack disrupt
the network topology and can become very stronger when
combined with another attacks[2].
2) Version Number Modification Attack: This internal
attack is occurred by changing version number(lower
to higher) of a DODAG tree. When nodes receive the
new higher version number DIO message they start the
formation of new DODAG tree. This results unoptimized or
inconsistency of network topology, increases control overhead
and higher packet loss[2].
3) Denial of Service Attack: Denial of service or
Distributed denial of service attack is attempt to make
resources unavailable to its valuable user [12-13]. In RPL
this attack can be done by the IPv6 UDP packet flooding[2].
4) Neighbor Attack: In this attack, intruder broadcast
DIO messages that it received without adding information of
himself.The node who receives this messages may conclude
that new neighbor node send this DIO message. The victim
nodes select the out range neighbors node for routing purpose
which affects network quality parameters[2].
5) Wormhole Attack: This attack can occurred by creating
tunnel between the two attackers and transmitting the selective
traffic through it which Disrupt the network topology and
traffic flow[2].
6) Decreased Rank Attacks: In a DODAG, rank is used for
positions of nodes relative to the sink node. It means lower
the rank is close to the root and vice verse. When a malicious
node advertises a lower rank value, it means, it wants majority
of traffic pass through it. As a result, many legitimate nodes
connect to the attacker. An attacker can change its rank
value through the falsification of DIO messages. finally, an
attacker either drop this messages or selectively forward these
messages. It becomes more powerful when combined with
other attacks[2].
7) Identity Attacks: Identity attacks contain clone ID and
sybil attacks. In a clone ID attack, an attacker copies the
identities of a valid node onto another physical node. In
a sybil attack, which is similar to a clone ID attack, an
attacker uses several logical entities on the same physical
node. These attacks can be used to take control over large
parts of a network without deploying physical nodes[2,12-13].
8) Sniffing Attacks: A sniffing attack perform by the
listening of the packets transmitted over the network. This
attack compromises the confidentiality of communications. It
also check the pattern of traffic for major attacks[12-13].
B. Blockchain
Blockchain is fundamentally a decentralized, distributed,
shared, and immutable database ledger that stores data across
a peer-to-peer (P2P) network. It has chained blocks of data
that have been timestamped and validated by miners. Funda-
mentally, the block data contains a list of all transactions and
a hash to the previous block. The blockchain has a full history
of all transactions and provides a global distributed trust[1].
C. Intrusion Detection System(IDS)
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a system that mon-
itors network traffic for suspicious activity and issues alerts
when such activity is occurred. These can be signature based
or anomaly based and network or host based depending upon
the need of application. These mainly used for the detection
of internal attacks.
D. Firewall
Firewall is used for protection from outsider attacks. This
use some threshold values or specific rules to filter unwanted
traffic such as filtering is based on port numbers, ip addresses
and many more parameters.
E. Trust
Trust means integrity, strength, ability, confidence of one
person on the other person or thing. A trust is a relationship
or agreement which one party, known as a trustor, gives
another party, the trustee.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2
describes the Related Work and motivation for our work.
Section 3 mentions our proposed framework system followed
by the theoretical analysis of work in section 4. In Section
5, a conclusion of our findings is presented with future
extensions to our work.
II. RELATED WORK & MOTIVATION
For detection and mitigation of RPL attacks, various
mechanisms are presented in the literature. But they have
their own pros and cons. They are useful for one attack but
not for others. There are no standardized framework system
for security of RPL network. Specific literature survey for
some of the attacks are present below.
In paper[1], They describe various IoT security issues,
open challenges and provide blockchain as a solution for
these attacks. They also review the RPL attacks and their
solutions present in the literature. In paper[2], the detailed
survey of various RPL attacks and their solutions are
presented. They describe taxonomy of RPL attacks based
on resources, topology and traffic. They also give risk
management process for these attacks.
In paper[3], They discuss and implement various RPL
attacks in cooja simulator. They also present various solution
present in the literature and give a new solution as Lightweight
heartbeat protocol for RPL network. This new protocol is
based on the successful transmission of ICMPv6 messages
from the root node to nodes and vice versa. This new protocol
gives less overhead but will work with its full potential if
IPsec with ESP is used.
In paper[4], They describe the blackhole attack and present
a solution for this in a 2-step process. In the first step, local
decision is made by a node by observing the behaviour of
neighbouring nodes. If any node is found to be suspicious,
then the final decision whether this node is blackhole node
or not taken by the root node, this process is called as global
verification process. This solution is very effective but in this,
every node observes the behaviour of its neighbours which
increases the memory overload in these constrained devices
and final decision is made by the root node which is a single
point of failure(if compromised).
In paper[5], They describe the wormhole attack and
present a solution for this as markle tree authentication. This
solution is effective but increases the network complexity
and control overhead due to the hashing and encryption
techniques. In paper[6], They describe sinkhole attacks and
give a solution which is the combination of two techniques as:
Rank authentication technique(one way hash chaining) and
parent fail-over technique(end to end acknowledgement). This
solution is very promising but sybil attack is not managed
by the parent fail-over technique and rank authentication is
secure untill a random number given to the root node is not
hacked by the attacker.
In paper[7], Authors presented SVELTE which is Real-
time intrusion detection system for the Internet of Things.
This IDS is extensible and also uses the feature of firewall.
But at a time implemented only few number of attacks
detection, rest are still waiting to implement. But what
if attackers hacked the security features of SVELTE? In
paper[8], A hybrid routing protocol which is the combination
of proactive and reactive approach is presented for wireless
sensor networks with mobile sinks. This approach is very
useful for network life time and maintaining cost of DAGs.
In paper[9], authors present a solution for rank and
version number attacks as VeRA-version number and rank
authentication in rpl. This solution is cryptographically secure
But their is some faulty results due to the missing correlation
between rank hash chain and version number hash chain. In
paper[10], authors present solutions for mitigating topological
attacks in RPL such as Vera++ and TRAIL. But both
technology uses cryptography which makes these solutions
highly complex and Distributed attackers communicated
out-of-band channel cannot be detected in this model.
In paper[11], authors present a solution as SecTrust-
RPL for mitigating the rank and sybil attacks. They use
trust(direct or recommended) as a defence mechanism. This
solution is very powerful but they assume the nodes are
stationary and use location as a defence metric. They only
simulate the direct trust in this model not the indirect one.
They also assume only 10% attacking nodes from the total
nodes and what if trust maintenance database is hacked by
the attacker?
As shown from the above discussion, we conclude that
every solution has some limitation. This is the base of my
motivation for doing this research because there is no standard
framework or method to providing security in RPL network.
Various security modes such as unsecured, preinstalled,
authenticated are theoretically presented in standard RPL
protocol. But, the real time IoT products(produced by cisco
and many more) and simulation tools (cooja, RIOT and many
more) are still support only unsecured mode. Security modes
are still remains for practical implementation due to the
constrained nature of Iot devices.
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK SYSTEM
We propose an ultimate approach (structure of proposed
framework is shown in figure 3) for removing all internal and
external RPL attacks. For removing internal attacks, we use a
IDS or trust based approach and for mitigating external attacks,
we have use some threshold values or rules in mini-firewall.
We use intrusion detection system(combination of signature
and anomaly based) at multiple locations (global and local)
for analyzing the behaviour of nodes. Global IDS must be
placed at 6LBR (sink node of rpl network) node and we take
multiple fixed local sink node (approximately 10-15 % of total
nodes) along with local IDS, finally local sink nodes attach to
the global sink node.
Fig. 3. Proposed Framework
Iot devices or nodes are either mobile or stationary attach
to the closest (closeness depends on the objective functions
used as hop count, latency and energy minimization) local
sink node. We also include the trust parameter(successful
messages exchange ratio) between local nodes for better
security. The final decision whether the node is attacker or
not depends on mainly three things as: trust between the
neighbouring nodes, local decision by multiple sink nodes
and global decision by root node. Mini-firewall is placed on
every node as well as on every sink node and contains the
list of authenticated nodes along with appropriate parameters
such as ip address and rank for mitigating the external attacks.
In figure 3, every node including sink node maintain a
database. For normal nodes, database contains the trust values
and list of authenticated nodes (firewall rules) of each of their
neighbour nodes(database is write protected or secure by the
private key). Trust value is defined by successful packets
exchange ratio such as more than 70 % ratio is treated as best
path, less than 40% is treated as worst and in between them
we check exactly three times(threshold value) for improving
result or path. In each of local sink node, their are various
tables or list with different functionalists. First table contain
all of signature IDS rule, firewall rules and threshold values.
Second thing we maintains a singly link list of blocks in
which each block contains the transactions or packets of their
local network according to particular time interval and block
size which is useful for tracking of real time data(anomaly
IDS).
For maintain immutability, each block contains the hash
of the previous block same as blockchain. These block
hashes and first table calculated hash are saved in second
table which is write protected or secure by the private key.
Both of the table update periodically whenever any new
hash or rules are occurred correspondingly. For backup
of data, we save the each of local sink link list to the
immediate neighbour(unidirectional) local sink along with
their hashes(update instantly). For global sink node, First
table is same as the local sink node. Secondly, we maintain
the combination of all link lists(update instantly) of each of
local sink node for global view of the RPL network. Second
table contains hash of first table along with hashes of all link
lists for each of local network and rest is same as local sink
node. Due to the resource constrained nature of devices, after
some particular time interval we remove particular number
of blocks from starting of link list along with their hashes in
both local as well as global sink nodes while maintaining the
summary of that records in the first table as adding some rules.
From the above we also say that, our proposed approach
also follows the blockchain features such as immutability,
decentralization, distributed and shared ledger. The more
explanatory database structure is shown in figure 4:
Fig. 4. Database Structure
IV. OBSERVATIONS & THEORETICAL RESULTS
The above proposed approach is theoretically analyzed in
the smart environment for mitigating the RPL attacks. Some
of the important analysis results & observations are as follows:
• It Removes the single point of failure(root node). As in
the proposed decentralized approach, The final decision
whether the node is attacker or not depends on mainly
three things as: trust between the neighbouring nodes,
local decision by multiple sink nodes and global decision
by root node.
• Due to the multiple local sink, number of transmission
is reduced from entire network to only closest sink and
every local sink node maintains DAG only upto limited
nodes in the main RPL network. So, it reduces network
load in terms of control message overhead and increased
throughput.
• Sink discovery by sensor nodes almost eliminate use of
old routes which results in re-transmission of packets.
Thus, reduces network overhead.
• For removing unauthenticated devices and
unauthenticated control packets(external attacks),
we use mini-firewall at every node(including sink node)
which maintains a database of authenticated devices
using some parameters as ip address, rank, version
number and sequence number.
• For mitigating the attacks occur from unencrypted
control frames or compromised nodes (internal attacks),
we use IDS which check the attacker at three phases.
At first phase, we take trust parameter between nodes as
mention above for selecting the best path (best parent
node) towards sink. In the second phase, each local sink
node maintain the link list of blocks for tracking the
history of their network. Finally the global sink node
maintain the history of DODAG (all local sink node) for
mitigating any attack. The sink nodes also uses signature
rules(as rank of parent node should be less than child
node and many more rules) for easily detecting of known
attacks.
• The link list of blocks is used for unknown attacks. For
maintaining immutability of data, hash of previous block
is contained in the current block same as blockchain by
which we can detect any changes in that blocks at very
less complexity. If we detect any changes, then from that
block to the current block in that link list is replaced by
the backup data(stored in the immediate neighbour sink
node).
• Signature based rules, threshold values and firewall rules
are periodically updated by which we take less time for
detecting already happened attacks previously.
• Due to the resource limitations of sink nodes, after a
particular time interval we remove certain number of
blocks along with their hashes(in second table) from
starting point of list while maintaining or adding that
blocks important features as rules in the first table.
• All of the attacks are mitigated by this proposed approach
by seeing behavior of a node up to joining of nodes into
this network. After recognizing of malicious node, it can
be easily removed from the network. Thus reduces DAG
inconsistency and improve network performance.
• We assume all sink nodes including 6LBR are stationary.
So, that we can check their geographical location for
more better protection.
• Overall, we use semi supervised IDS, Blockchain fea-
tures, Trust parameters and mini-Firewall for protecting
RPL network from various attacks.
V. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
Finally, we say that RPL network(one of the most used
routing protocol in IoT)is prone to various kind of attacks
as rank, version modification attack and sybil attack etc.
These attacks are very dangerous for the network resources
and performance. These attacks are occur due to problem of
unauthenticated or unencrypted control frames, centralized
root controller, compromised or unauthenticated devices
and many more ways. There is no standard protection
framework developed yet in the survey. So, we develop
an ultimate framework for mitigating RPL attacks in smart
environment. In this approach we use multiple sinks, Trust,
semi supervised IDS and firewall mechanisms from protection
to these attacks. We also maintain blockchain features for
more better security. Then, we theoretically analyzed our
approach which is very effective and reliable for mitigating
these attacks. It also reduces network overhead along with
increases the performance and throughput of the network
due to the multiple sinks. These node’s information are
never compromised by the attacker due to the IDS, Firewall
techniques and distributed blockchain features.
This is our ongoing research work. In the future work,
Firstly we will do simulation or real time implementation
of this approach using network simulator (NS3) for RPL
Secure network along with Ethereum blockchain. After that
we will focus on more attacks such as Zero day attacks in
RPL protocol and other layers attacks in IoT stack. We also
want to reduce the complexity of our approach as low as
possible through new ideas such as how to remove blocks of
data at more effective way so that it can not loss any important
information. Lastly we must ensure, our approach is backward
compatible to original protocol.
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